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Current Account Imbalances 
in the Euro Area
ALAN AHEARNE, BIRGIT SCHMITZ, and JÜRGEN VON HAGEN 
Rising and persistent global imbalances have been the focus of a lively de-
bate among policymakers and academic economists in recent years. Most
of the controversy has concentrated on the large US current account
deficit and its main counterpart, the large current account surpluses of
countries in Asia. Europe has not attracted much attention in this debate,
most likely because European countries and the European Union as a
whole have a long tradition of keeping their current accounts relatively
close to balance (Ahearne and von Hagen 2005). But current account de-
velopments in Europe deserve attention for several reasons. For starters,
current account imbalances in EU countries and in particular among those
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have grown considerably in
recent years. It is natural to wonder whether these imbalances can be ex-
plained by fundamental economic factors or whether they point to a po-
tential unsustainability of the common currency. 
This chapter explores the determinants of the current account bal-
ances of both the overall euro area and individual EU member countries,
and also considers both intra- and extra-European Union current account
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balances. We interpret current account balances as the counterpart of
capital flows and ask to what extent they are attributable to economic
convergence among countries with different per capita incomes.
After this brief introduction, we show some stylized facts on current ac-
count balances in the euro area. Then we present evidence that capital
tends to flow from high- to low-income euro area economies and that
these flows have increased since the creation of the single currency in Eu-
rope. We close with a brief forecast of likely challenges based on our
analysis.
Stylized Facts
In this section we present some of the main stylized facts about individ-
ual EMU member countries’ current account balances. Figure 2.1 shows
these balances for the euro area as a whole and for individual EU coun-
tries in selected years since 1985.
As an aggregate, the euro area tends to be financially self-contained and
contributes little to the absorption of current account imbalances in other
parts of the world. Current account balances have typically been small
over this 20-year period (with 1995 being a noticeable exception), notwith-
standing the fact that some EU countries have sizable current account im-
balances. Germany, for example, has recorded annual surpluses of around
$100 billion in recent years, and its surplus is estimated to have reached
4
1⁄4 percent of GDP in 2006. This has brought the country back to its tradi-
tional position of surplus, as was the case in 1985. Finland, Sweden, and
the Netherlands have run even larger surpluses relative to GDP in the
past six years. In contrast, Portugal’s current account deficit was nearly 10
percent of GDP in 2006, while deficits in Greece and Spain exceeded 8 per-
cent of GDP. All three countries have had sizable deficits since the start of
the EMU.1
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of EMU current account balances.
Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands have con-
sistently run surpluses during the past five years. Germany registered
small current account deficits averaging about 1 percent of GDP during
most of the 1990s before swinging into surplus in 2002, and this surplus
has widened steadily over recent years as the country’s exports have out-
paced its imports. Recent years have also seen a marked increase in the
current account surplus of the Netherlands, while Finland’s surplus has
nearly returned to its level at the beginning of EMU after growing to
nearly 10 percent in 2001.
1. See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) for a discussion of Greece and Portugal in this regard.
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Figure 2.1    European current account balances
percent of GDP
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Figure 2.2    Current account balances under Economic and Monetary  
 Union,  1995–2006
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, September 2006.
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At the other end of the spectrum, Greece, Portugal, and Spain have con-
sistently run current account deficits in the past five years, and their defi-
cits have widened significantly both under EMU and during the run-up
to the EMU. All three countries had current account positions close to bal-
ance around the mid-1990s. Recent years have seen an especially sharp
decline in Spain’s current account balance from roughly 3
1⁄2 percent of
GDP in 2003 to an estimated 8
1⁄4 percent in 2006.
Current account deficits of the magnitudes now seen in Greece, Portu-
gal, and Spain are unprecedented among euro area countries, with the ex-
ception of Ireland in the mid-1980s and Portugal in the 1970s (European
Commission 2006). Current account deficits of more than 8 percent of GDP
are also large compared with advanced non–euro area economies. Sus-
tained current account deficits accrue to the net international investment
position; net external liabilities relative to GDP have soared to nearly 80
percent in Greece, 60 percent in Portugal, and 40 percent in Spain.
One interpretation of the evolution of EMU current account balances is
that the increased dispersion of current account positions has been driven
by trade flows that reflect shifts in relative competitiveness in the euro area
(see, for example, Blanchard 2006b; European Commission 2006; and Wolf-
gang Münchau, “Why Internal Imbalances in the Euro Area Matter,” Fi-
nancial Times, November 8, 2006). On this account, aggregate demand was
too strong in some countries and too weak in others, resulting in persistent
differences in inflation rates across countries. In fact, the size and persis-
tence of inflation differentials at the national level are the most widely rec-
ognized and documented facts relating to the start of the EMU. As a result
of persistent differences in inflation across countries, euro area economies
have experienced sizable swings in the real exchange rates vis-à-vis their
peers, as shown in figure 2.3. In turn, the changes in competitiveness asso-
ciated with these movements in real exchange rates may have played a role
in bringing about the large swings in current account balances. The rela-
tionship between real exchange rate developments and current account bal-
ances portrayed in figure 2.4 appears to confirm that euro area countries
that have gained (lost) competitiveness relative to other euro-area countries
during EMU are now running large current account surpluses (deficits).
In particular, Blanchard (2006a) ascribes Portugal’s economic boom in
the late 1990s to the sharp drop in interest rates and heightened expecta-
tions for faster convergence that resulted from participation in the EMU.
Rapid economic growth and a decline in unemployment led to an increase
in wage growth to a rate substantially above the growth in labor produc-
tivity. As a result, competitiveness deteriorated sharply, export growth
weakened, and Portugal’s trade and current account deficits widened
markedly. Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry (2006) document that in 1999–2005,
cumulative growth in Portugal’s gross exports was as much as 10 per-
centage points below the euro area average. Greece, Italy, and Spain also
experienced relatively sluggish growth in gross exports over this period.
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Figure 2.3    Intra–euro area real (CPI) trade-weighted exchange rates,
 1999Q1–2006Q2
CPI = consumer price index
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission’s Eurostat data.
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Some commentators have linked the strong performance of German ex-
ports in recent years to gains in competitiveness associated with a rate of
inflation that has been persistently below the euro area average (Ahearne
and Pisani-Ferry 2006; Münchau, Financial Times, November 8, 2006). Ac-
cording to this view, wage restraint, facilitated by a decline in unionization
in Germany’s labor market, has kept growth in unit labor costs well below
the euro area average, boosting the competitiveness of German exporters.
Revealingly, two-thirds of the 1.2 percent annual average growth in Ger-
man GDPover the period 1999–2005 came from net exports, with only one-
third from growth in domestic demand (Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry 2006).
The policy implication from this perspective is that, in order to achieve
internal balance, deficit countries in the euro area need fiscal contractions
to slow aggregate demand and that the surplus countries ought to boost
aggregate demand. One problem with this prescription, however, is that
Germany and the Netherlands until recently had trouble meeting their
obligations under the Stability and Growth Pact and have little room for
maneuver with regard to fiscal policy. Most of the adjustment would thus
have to come from the deficit countries.
An important question is how the large current account deficits in
Greece, Portugal, and Spain are being financed. The European Commis-
sion (2006) documents that a large part of the net financial inflows into
these countries under the EMU took the form of bank loans. For Greece,
Figure 2.4    Real exchange rates and current account balances
 
Sources:  European Commission, Eurostat database; International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook, September 2006.
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Belgium
Netherlands
Finland
Germany
France
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
r
e
a
l
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
,
 
1
9
9
9
Q
1
–
2
0
0
6
Q
2
current account as percent of GDP in 2006
Austria
Ireland
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
02 –10 –8 –6 –4 –2 4 6 8 10
02--Ch. 2--41-58  6/19/08  9:23 AM  Page 4748 CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION
net portfolio inflows have also been important. Outflows of foreign direct
investment have generally exceeded inflows in all three countries. For ex-
ample, German banks’ lending abroad exceeded their foreign borrowing
to the tune of about 2
1⁄2 percent of GDP annually during 1999–2005. In con-
trast, in 1992–98, German banks were significant net borrowers from the
rest of the world. 
One hypothesis is that by eliminating exchange rate risk, the creation of
the single currency in Europe has boosted financial flows from high- to
low-income countries in the euro area (financial flows from high-income
euro area countries to low-income countries outside the euro area have
not increased). Of course, the EMU has coincided with other efforts to
promote increased financial integration in Europe. 
Net Financial Flows and the EMU
In this section we examine in more detail the pattern of net financial flows
between the EU-15 countries and other EU countries.2 According to neo-
classical growth theory, current account imbalances reflect capital flows,
thus capital should flow from rich countries to poor countries. The latter
have lower levels of capital per worker (this explains in part why they are
poor) and this scarcity of capital relative to labor should mean that returns
to capital are high. Savers in rich countries should therefore consider poor
countries profitable places in which to invest.3
We present some simple econometric evidence on the determinants of
capital flows between EU-15 countries and between these and non-EU-15
countries. Ideally, we would use individual country data on intra- and
extra-EU-15 current account positions to measure financial flows, but
these data are not readily available; as a proxy for current account bal-
ances, we use intra- and extra-EU-15 trade balances.4 Our main aim is to
examine whether capital tends to flow from rich to poor EU-15 countries
and whether the creation of the single currency in Europe has affected
such flows.
2. The EU-15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
3. In reality, however, surprisingly little capital flows from rich countries to poor countries
(Lucas 1990). Several explanations have been put forward, including differences in human
capital between rich and poor countries as well as failures in international capital markets
that might account for the lack of flows. However, none of these candidates can come near
to explaining quantitatively the observed shortage of capital flows relative to what economic
theory would predict.
4. Based on the AMECO data used below, the correlation between total trade balances and
current accounts is above 0.91 for all countries except the United Kingdom (0.73) and Ireland
(–0.16).
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Data
We use annual individual country data on both intra- and extra-EU-15 ex-
ports and imports of goods over the period 1981–2005 (we do not include
exports and imports of services because of a lack of reliable data). Our
sample covers the EU-15 countries (with Belgium and Luxembourg ag-
gregated because of the former monetary union between the two). We
consider intra-EU-15 trade balances (calculated as a country’s exports to
other EU-15 countries less its imports from other EU-15 countries), extra-
EU-15 trade balances (a country’s exports to non-EU-15 countries less im-
ports from non-EU-15 countries), and total trade balances (the sum of
intra- and extra-EU-15 trade balances). We also focus on the subset of EU-
15 countries that are members of the euro area (12 countries excluding
Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). All data are from the Eu-
ropean Commission’s annual macroeconomic (AMECO) database.
Figure 2.5 plots over time the dispersion across countries of each of the
five different types of trade balances, defined as the unweighted cross-
section standard deviation. The dispersion in trade balances trended up-
ward during the 1990s and then accelerated somewhat after 1999. The ob-
servation of widening differences among the current account balances of
EU member states is also found in Blanchard (2006b), who compares the
Figure 2.5    Dispersion of trade balances, 1981–2005
standard deviation, 
percent of GDP 
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total current account of each country with the rest of the world and shows
that the dispersion also increases among OECD countries.
Figure 2.5 shows that the dispersion of intra-EU trade balances is con-
sistently larger than that of extra-EU trade balances and that the former
has risen faster than the latter since the mid-1980s. Separating euro and
non-euro countries among the EU-15 makes no significant difference.
Figure 2.6 shows the behavior of the (unweighted) average of trade bal-
ances over the past 25 years, indicating that the average EU-15 country
had a trade surplus against its EU partners since the mid-1990s and a
slight deficit against non-EU countries since the start of the EMU. We also
counted the number of years in which a country’s trade balance against
its EU partners had the same or the opposite sign from its trade balance
against the rest of the world. Greece had the same sign on both balances
in all 25 years, Portugal in 23 years, and Spain in 21 years. In contrast, Ger-
many and the Netherlands had opposite signs on the two balances in all
25 years. Countries consistently running deficits against their EU partners
tended to borrow from those and from the rest of the world. In contrast,
Germany and the Netherlands tended to borrow from the rest of the
world and lend to other EU countries, thus positioning themselves as fi-
nancial intermediaries in Europe.
Figure 2.6    Average trade balances, 1981–2005
percent of GDP 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the European Commission’s annual macroeconomic 
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Table 2.1 shows the correlation coefficients between the intra- and extra-
EU trade balances for our sample countries. For Germany, Spain, the
Netherlands, and Portugal, the correlation is significantly negative—that
is, an increasing trade deficit with respect to other EU countries tends to
be compensated for by a shrinking deficit with respect to the rest of the
world. For the other countries, the correlation is positive. 
Table 2.2 reports the results of bivariate causality tests between intra-
and extra-EU trade balances. Generally, dynamic correlations between the
two are small and insignificant. In Spain and Portugal, we find causality
running from the extra- to the intra-EU trade balance, with a negative ef-
fect of the former on the latter. In Finland, there is causality in the same
direction but with a positive effect. In Spain, Austria, and the United
Kingdom, we find causality from the intra- to the extra-EU balance, with
a positive effect in the case of Spain and the United Kingdom and a neg-
ative effect in the case of Austria.
Trade Balances and Per Capita Income 
We run some simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to examine
the determinants of trade balances in individual European countries. We
are particularly interested in any possible relationship between trade bal-
ances (and therefore financial flows) and per capita income. The depen-
dent variable in our regressions is the ratio of the trade balance to GDP.
Table 2.1 Correlation between intra- and extra-EU trade balances,
1981–2005
Country 1981–2005 1981–98 1999–2005
Belgium and Luxembourg –0.14 0.09 –0.61
Germany –0.39** –0.03 –0.88***
Greece –0.03 –0.59*** –0.52
Spain –0.35* –0.48** 0.77**
France 0.60*** 0.68*** 0.96***
Ireland 0.67*** 0.81*** 0.02
Italy 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.61
Netherlands –0.96*** –0.84*** –0.85***
Austria 0.14 –0.49** –0.33
Portugal –0.55*** –0.47** 0.84**
Finland 0.49*** 0.51** –0.12
Denmark 0.04 0.02 –0.51
Sweden 0.49** 0.65*** –0.83**
United Kingdom 0.16 0.14 –0.65
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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We consider two variations of the dependent variable, corresponding to
the different measures of the trade balance for EU-15 countries discussed
above: intra-EU-15 trade balance to GDP and total trade balance to GDP.
The main explanatory variable is real per capita GDP. We also create
three dummy variables: The EMU dummy is equal to 1 for EMU member
countries after the start of the monetary union;5 the non-EMU dummy is
set to 1 for non–euro area countries from 1999 on; and DKSEUK is 1 for
the countries that do not participate in the EMU, Denmark, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. We interact the main explanatory variable with these
dummies to see whether the introduction of the euro changed the deter-
minants of net capital flows. (We also included a dummy variable for Ger-
man unification, but this turned out not to be statistically significant.)
Our results are presented in table 2.3. We report three specifications for
each dependent variable. The first specification (shown in column A) uses
only the dummies and GDP per capita as explanatory variables. The sec-
ond (column B) adds the general government balance as a ratio of GDP
and the real price of oil in US dollars. The former is motivated by the ef-
fect of public-sector deficits on the current account in conventional macro
models; the latter is motivated by the fact that EU countries (except the
United Kingdom) are dependent on oil imports. The third specification
5. We chose 1999 as the starting date for all euro area members except Greece, which did not
join until 2001.
Table 2.2 Causality tests between intra- and 
extra-EU trade balances
Country Intra → extra Extra → intra
Belgium 0.73 0.55
Germany 0.47 0.19
Greece 0.57 0.24
Spain 0.05 0.01
France 0.89 0.34
Ireland 0.65 0.73
Italy 0.63 0.86
Netherlands 0.33 0.43
Austria 0.03 0.39
Portugal 0.27 0.02
Finland 0.17 0.01
Denmark 0.80 0.23
Sweden 0.35 0.02
United Kingdom 0.06 0.93
Note: Table entries are the p-values of an F-test of the significance of two
lags of the potentially causal variable in a regression where two lags of the
causal variable are used. All regressions are in first differences.
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(column C) adds time dummies to the model and uses a generalized least
squares (GLS) estimator accounting for panel heteroskedasticity and first-
order autocorrelation of the residuals.
Looking at the data in table 2.3a, column A, we find that trade surpluses
in the European Union are a positive function of per capita income in the
EU-15 and that the relationship is strongly statistically significant. Gener-
ally, countries with a larger per capita GDP have larger intra-EU trade bal-
ances. Before the start of the EMU, the effect of a rising per capita GDP on
a country’s intra-EU trade balance was 0.55; afterward this positive coef-
ficient becomes notable and significantly stronger for the euro area coun-
tries after the beginning of EMU. Because the effect is significantly weaker
for the nonparticipating countries (Denmark, Sweden, and the United
Table 2.3 Determinants of trade balances in European countries 
a. Dependent variable: Intra-EU trade balance
Variable Specification A Specification B Specification C
Constant –9.19*** –6.38*** –8.25***
(1.22) (1.74) (1.38)
Dummy EMU –13.48*** –14.35*** –2.02
(2.64) (2.65) (1.35)
Dummy non-EMU –9.36 –8.28 –4.55
(11.03) (10.93) (3.12)
Dummy DKSEUK 5.04 4.30 6.21***
(3.69) (3.65) (1.53)
GDP per capita 0.55*** 0.45*** 0.58***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
(GDP per capita)*EMU 0.55*** 0.58*** 0.17***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.06)
(GDP per capita)*non-EMU 0.32 0.27 0.25**
(0.39) (0.39) (0.11)
(GDP per capita)*DKSEUK –0.40** –0.37** –0.47***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.08)
Fiscal balance 0.26*** 0.10***
(0.08) (0.03)
Real oil price –0.0001 –0.02***
(0.004) (0.01)
Time dummies No No Yes
Method OLS OLS GLS
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.37
Number of observations 350 350 350
(table continues next page)
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Kingdom), we conclude that it is not merely a general effect for all EU
countries. Instead, the estimates indicate that the EMU has significantly
changed the direction of capital flows in the euro area. There is thus a
marked difference between the EU countries that formed the monetary
union and those that decided not to join.
The remaining specifications show that this result is robust. Fiscal bal-
ances have a significantly positive effect on the intra-EU trade balance. In
the simplest specification, a rise in the fiscal balance by 1 percent of GDP
Table 2.3 Determinants of trade balances in European countries
(continued)
b. Dependent variable: Total trade balance
Variable Specification A Specification B Specification C
Constant –17.09*** –11.49*** –15.09***
(1.26) (1.76) (1.71)
Dummy EMU –15.60*** –17.50*** –2.55
(2.73) (2.69) (1.70)
Dummy non-EMU –13.60 –13.43 –8.13**
(11.40) (11.11) (4.12)
Dummy DKSEUK 7.03* 5.97 12.44***
(3.81) (3.71) (2.30)
GDP per capita 0.91*** 0.74*** 0.89***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
(GDP per capita)*EMU 0.58*** 0.66*** 0.15**
(0.13) (0.12) (0.07)
(GDP per capita)*non-EMU 0.41 0.38 0.36***
(0.40) (0.39) (0.14)
(GDP per capita)*DKSEUK –0.45*** –0.39** –0.73***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.10)
Fiscal balance 0.35*** 0.16***
(0.09) (0.04)
Real oil price –0.01** –0.03***
(0.004) (0.01)
Time dummies No No Yes
Method OLS OLS GLS
R2 0.53 0.56
Number of observations 350 350 350
DKSEUK = Denmark, Sweden, and United Kingdom; EMU = Economic and Monetary Union;
GLS = generalized least squares; OLS = ordinary least squares
Notes: GLS estimator accounts for heteroskedasticity between countries and country-specific
autocorrelation of residuals. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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raises the intra-EU trade balance by 0.26 percent of GDP. The inclusion of
time dummies and use of a GLS estimator reduce that effect to 0.10 per-
cent of GDP. Since the government balance might be considered endoge-
nous relative to the trade balance (e.g., because governments might pur-
sue a current account target for fiscal policy), we also estimated models
using an instrument for the government balance based on two lags of the
government balance and two lags of the total trade balance as well as
using the lagged balance as an explanatory variable. In both cases, the
government balance retained a positive coefficient, but its marginal sig-
nificance level dropped below 10 percent.6
The real price of oil has a negative impact on the intra-EU trade balance,
which is significant only in the GLS estimation in column C. Adding these
controls does not change the main result regarding the effects of per
capita GDP and the EMU and non-EMU effects.
Table 2.3b confirms the same results for total trade balances: The effect
of per capita GDP on total trade balances increases for the euro area coun-
tries with the beginning of the EMU, while it decreases for the non–euro
area countries. The effect of fiscal balances on total trade balances is pos-
itive and significant: Arise in the fiscal balance by 1 percent of GDP raises
the trade balance by about 0.2 percent of GDP. This indicates that only
about 1 percent of Portugal’s trade deficit of 12.6 percent in 2005 can be
explained by its general government deficit of 5.6 percent; Spain’s trade
deficit (8.6 percent of GDP in 2005) would have been even larger had the
country not had a government surplus of 1 percent of GDP.7
These results suggest that the EMU has increased capital market inte-
gration in Europe, with the result that capital flows are now more in line
with what neoclassical growth theory predicts. As capital flows from
high– to low–per capita GDP countries, these flows can be expected to pro-
mote economic convergence among the euro area countries. This means
that the allocation of capital is becoming more efficient in Europe and that
the observed current account imbalances indicate that the monetary
union works well. By implication, a fiscal expansion in the surplus coun-
tries would tend to absorb more of their domestic savings and slow capi-
tal flows to poorer countries, thus rendering the EMU less efficient.
Given the simplicity of our estimated equations, these results are sug-
gestive rather than definitive. Nonetheless, our reading of the results is
that the monetary union seems to have made a difference in that high-
6. We also estimated models using instruments for the government budget balance for the
extra-EU trade balance and the total trade balance. The results were similar and are not reported.
7. De Santis and Lührmann (2006) and Chinn and Prasad (2003) find that relative per capita
income has a positive effect on the current account balance in a large panel of countries from
1970 to 2003. They also employ squared relative income as a regressor. Following their pa-
pers, we used squared per capita income as an additional regressor in the models for the
intra-EU, extra-EU, and total balances but did not find a significant effect. 
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income EMU countries have become lenders to their low-income coun-
tries within EMU much more than on a global scale. This shows that mon-
etary union has greatly increased capital market integration among the
participating countries. More efficient capital allocation in the region is a
major benefit from monetary union.
Conclusion
We have documented a growing dispersion in current account balances
among countries in the euro area since the early 1990s. The differences in
current account positions widened significantly following the creation of
the EMU. We have shown that the union has changed the pattern of cap-
ital flows in Europe; specifically, it has increased the tendency of capital
to flow from relatively rich to relatively poor countries in the euro area.
This trend suggests that the observed current account imbalances are a
sign of the proper functioning of the euro area rather than a sign of im-
proper macroeconomic management.
The results also carry an important message for the new member states
of the European Union, which have experienced sizable capital inflows
over the past decade. Our results suggest that they should expect another
significant increase in capital inflows upon adopting the euro, as their per
capita incomes are much smaller than those of the incumbent members.
Managing large capital inflows will be one of the principal challenges of
joining the monetary union for these countries.
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